By J. Peter Pham, contributor
By every right, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ought to be one of the richest countries in the world. The Belgian geologist René Jules Cornet, whose work in the 1890s uncovered the Congo’s immense mineral reserves — currently valued by some estimates at more than $24 trillion and including 70 percent of the world’s coltan, 30 percent of its diamond reserves, as well as vast amounts of cobalt, copper, gold and many other sought-after primary commodities — dubbed the territory a « veritable geological scandal. » The real scandal, however, is that this treasure has yet to better the lives of the people of Africa’s second-largest and fourth-most populous country. To the contrary, the most recent edition of the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index ranked the lush, mineral-rich DRC at the absolute bottom of the 187 countries and territories included in the survey (tying landlocked, mostly desert Niger for last place), while the Fund for Peace’s 2013 Failed States Index put the country in 177th place out of 178 countries (just a notch above long-collapsed Somalia).
Instead of prosperity, the Congo’s wealth has brought a seemingly endless procession of unscrupulous adventurers eager to exploit its riches: from Leopold II of the Belgians who, at the Berlin Conference in 1885, persuaded the crowned heads of Europe, most of whom were his cousins, to gift him with a territory 76 times larger than his tiny kingdom as his own personal property, to Mobutu Seso Seko, who was allowed by the « logic » of the Cold War to likewise rule the same area as a private fief, to the current president, Joseph Kabila, who, at the ripe old age of 29, inherited the job from his assassinated father in 2001.On paper, the DRC has improved somewhat on the younger Kabila’s watch. Thanks in part to the presence of the world’s largest United Nations peacekeeping mission and the more robust stance those forces have taken in recent years toward various armed groups, the violent conflicts which have torn the Congo apart for more than a generation have been reduced to more manageable proportions. Consequently, since 2002, the country’s economy has grown an average of 6 percent a year and this year it is expected to top 9 percent. However, as in the past, little of the newfound prosperity has trickled down to the population, 95 percent of whom live on less than $2 a day. The World Food Program estimates that more than half of Congolese children are either acutely or chronically malnourished.
Its official name notwithstanding, the DRC also suffers from a troubling democracy deficit. In the more than 17 years which the Kabilas, père et fils, have held sway over the country, local elections have never been held: to this day, every last mayor, burgmeister and neighborhood chief in the length and breadth of the Congo is appointed by presidential decree from the far-off capital of Kinshasa. Last month, the election commission announced yet another postponement in the long-delayed voting for municipal and local government officials that had, most recently, been scheduled to begin in June 2015.
Despite his long hold on power, the incumbent president who, in 2011, awarded himself a second five-year term in elections which were roundly criticized by official observers from the European Union and the Carter Center, and denounced as « treachery, lies, and terror » by the DRC’s Roman Catholic bishops, whose nearly 40,000 trained poll watchers provided exhaustive evidence to back for the assertion, now finds himself in a bind of his own making. The constitution, approved by a referendum Joseph Kabila himself presided over in 2005, not only limits a president to two consecutive five-year terms (article 70), but also contains a clause (article 220) that specifically stipulates that — along with the republican form of government, universal suffrage and other basic provisions — the limit on presidential terms is absolute and not subject to « any constitutional revision. »
This last provision has been recently subject to considerable diplomatic efforts by the United States and others. During his visit to the DRC last month, Secretary of State John Kerry publicly urged Kabila to respect the constitution and not attempt to seek another term: « The United States of America believes that a country is strengthened, that people have respect for their nation and their government, when a constitutional process is properly implemented and upheld by that government. … We’re a country with term limits. We live by them. We had several hundred years of transformation under that process, and we encourage other countries to adhere to their constitution. » To this end, America’s chief diplomat announced that the United States would contribute $30 million, most of which will go to nongovernmental organizations, to help the Congolese hold elections.
Briefing the press during Kerry’s trip, Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region and the DRC Russell Feingold was even more explicit than his former Senate colleague: « The people of this country have a right to have their constitution respected. They have a right to choose their president in accordance with their constitution. The constitution here provides for two terms. … That provision should be respected. » Earlier this month, Feingold joined the special envoys of the UN, the African Union and the European Union at a meeting with the head of the DRC’s national election commission where the diplomats called for the publication of a comprehensive election calendar that included a fixed date for the 2016 presidential poll.
Kabila is not taking the pressure lying down. While his some of his spokesmen have been howling about foreigners who « meddle in domestic affairs, » the president is using the Congo’s prodigious resources to secure alternative backing from outsiders perceived to be more open to his staying in power. According to Congolese sources, availing himself of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s conflict with the United States and its European partners over Ukraine, as well as Russia’s renewed interest in Africa, Kabila recently dispatched Ambassador-at-Large Sérafin Ngwej to Moscow with a proposal to buy $3 billion in weapons. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Alexandre Luba Ntambo was sent to Beijing in early June for talks with Xu Qiliang, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, on expanding bilateral security ties to match the economic links.
With so much at stake, things are likely to get much rougher before they get any smoother in the heart of Africa.
Pham is director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.
Démocratie Chrétienne, D.C. 
cessez de glorifier ce démon qui va *****, bientôôôooooooooooooooooooooo !!!
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 15:07:40 +0000
To: eliebentati@live.fr
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Démocratie participative-Un modèle délibératif pour la RDC comme une voie à suivre
Plus fondamentalement, la démocratie délibérative affirme la nécessité de justifier les décisions prises par les citoyens et leurs représentants. Les deux sont censés justifier les lois qu’ils imposeraient un sur l’autre. Dans une démocratie, les dirigeants devraient donc donner les raisons de leurs décisions et de répondre à des raisons que les citoyens donnent en retour. Mais pas tous les problèmes, tout le temps, requiert une délibération. La démocratie délibérative fait de la place pour de nombreuses autres formes de prise de décisions (y compris la négociation entre les groupes), pour autant que l’utilisation de ces formes elles-mêmes est justifiée à un moment donné dans un processus de délibération. Sa première et la plus importante caractéristique est son exigence de la raison qui donne.
Le fondement moral de ce processus de raison-donnant est commun à de nombreuses conceptions de la démocratie. Les personnes doivent être traités non seulement comme des objets de la législation, comme des sujets passifs à être exclus, mais comme des agents autonomes qui participent à la gouvernance de leur propre société, directement ou par leurs représentants. En démocratie délibérative un moyen important de ces agents prennent part est par la présentation et répondent à des raisons ou en exigeant que leurs représentants fassent, dans le but de justifier les lois en vertu desquelles ils doivent vivre ensemble. Les raisons sont destinés à la fois pour produire une décision justifiable et d’exprimer la valeur de respect mutuel. Il ne suffit pas que les citoyens affirment leur pouvoir par intérêt négociation du groupe, ou en votant aux élections. Pas un sérieux suggéré que la décision de faire la guerre doit être déterminée par un tirage au sort, ou qu’il devrait être soumis à un référendum. D’affirmations de puissance et des expressions de la volonté, de toute évidence un élément clé de la politique démocratique, doivent encore être justifié par la raison.
Une deuxième caractéristique de la démocratie délibérative, c’est que les raisons invoquées pour le processus devraient être accessibles à tous les citoyens à qui ils sont adressés. Pour justifier imposer leur volonté sur vous, vos concitoyens doivent donner des raisons qui soient compréhensibles pour vous. Si vous cherchez à imposer votre volonté sur eux, vous leur devez rien de moins. Cette forme de réciprocité signifie que les raisons doivent être publiques, et pas seulement dans l’intimité de son esprit. À cet égard, la démocratie délibérative est en contraste avec la conception rousseauiste de la démocratie, dans lequel les individus à réfléchir sur leur propre ce qui est bon pour la société dans son ensemble, puis viennent à l’assemblée et de voter conformément à la volonté générale.
La troisième caractéristique de la démocratie délibérative est que le processus vise à produire une décision qui est valable pour une certaine période de temps. À cet égard, le processus de délibération n’est pas comme un talk-show ou un séminaire académique. Les participants ne font pas valoir pour la commodité du raisonnement; ils ne prétendent même pas pour soi la vérité (même si la véracité de leur argument est une vertu délibérative parce que c’est un objectif nécessaire pour justifier leur décision). Ils ont l’intention de leur discussion d’influencer une décision du gouvernement fera, ou un processus qui aura une incidence sur les décisions futures sont faites. À un certain point, la délibération cesse temporairement, et les dirigeants de prendre une décision.
Cette suite du débat illustre la quatrième caractéristique de la démocratie délibérative, son processus est dynamique. Bien que la délibération vise à une décision justifiable, il ne présuppose pas que la décision à prendre sera en fait justifiée, et encore moins qu’une justification aujourd’hui suffira pour un avenir indéterminé. Il laisse ouverte la possibilité d’un dialogue permanent, celui dans lequel les citoyens peuvent critiquer les décisions précédentes et aller de l’avant sur la base de cette critique. Bien que la décision doit reposer pendant une certaine période de temps, il est provisoire en ce sens qu’il doit être ouvert pour contester à un certain moment dans l’avenir. Cette caractéristique de la démocratie délibérative est négligée, même par la plupart de ses partisans.
Les démocrates délibératifs soins autant sur ce qui se passe après une décision est prise sur ce qui se passe avant. Garder le processus de prise de décision ouvert de cette manière-en reconnaissant que ses résultats sont provisoires est importante pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, en politique comme en beaucoup de la vie pratique, les processus décisionnels et la compréhension humaine dont ils dépendent sont imparfaites. Par conséquent, nous ne pouvons pas être sûrs que les décisions que nous prenons aujourd’hui seront demain correct, et même les décisions qui semblent plus solides à l’heure peut paraître moins justifiables à la lumière des éléments de preuve plus tard.
Une implication importante de cette fonction dynamique de la démocratie délibérative, c’est que le débat se poursuit, il nécessite devrait observer ce que nous appelons le principe de l’économie de désaccord moral. Pour motiver leurs décisions, les citoyens et leurs représentants devraient essayer de trouver des justifications qui minimisent leurs différences avec leurs adversaires. Les démocrates délibératifs ne s’attendent pas à la délibération toujours ou même habituellement pour donner un accord. Comment les citoyens face à la mésentente qui est endémique dans la vie politique devrait donc être une question centrale dans toute démocratie. Pratiquer l’économie de désaccord moral promeut la valeur de respect mutuel (qui est au cœur de la démocratie électorale délibérative). En économisant sur leurs désaccords, les citoyens et leurs représentants peuvent continuer à travailler ensemble pour trouver un terrain d’entente, si elle n’est pas sur les politiques qui ont produit le désaccord, puis sur les politiques connexes sur lesquelles celles-ci une plus grande chance de trouver un accord.
La combinaison de ces quatre caractéristiques, nous pouvons définir la démocratie délibérative comme une forme de gouvernement dans laquelle les citoyens libres et égaux (et leurs représentants), justifient les décisions dans un processus dans lequel ils donnent une autre des raisons qui sont mutuellement acceptables et accessibles à tous, dans le but de parvenir à des conclusions qui sont obligatoires dans le présent sur tous les citoyens, mais ouvert à contester à l’avenir. Nous pouvons affiner il est signifiant et de la défendre est revendications en considérant dans quelle mesure la démocratie délibérative est démocratique; quelles fins il sert; pourquoi il est mieux que les autres; quels types de démocratie délibérative / participative sont justifiables; et comment ses critiques peuvent être répondues.
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Participatory Democracy—A Deliberative Model for the DRC as a Way Forward
Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another. In a democracy, leaders should therefore give reasons for their decisions, and respond to the reasons that citizens give in return. But not all issues, all the time, require deliberation. Deliberative democracy makes room for many other forms of decision-making (including bargaining among groups), as long as the use of these forms themselves is justified at some point in a deliberative process. Its first and most important characteristic is its reason-giving requirement.
The moral basis for this reason-giving process is common to many conceptions of democracy. Persons should be treated not merely as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take part in the governance of their own society, directly or through their representatives. In deliberative democracy an important way these agents take part is by presenting and responding to reasons or by demanding that their representatives do so, with the aim of justifying the laws under which they must live together. The reasons are meant both to produce a justifiable decision and to express the value of mutual respect. It is not enough that citizens assert their power through interest group bargaining, or by voting in elections. No one seriously suggested that the decision to go to war should be determined by a coin toss, or that it should be subject to a referendum. Assertions of power and expressions of will, obviously a key component of democratic politics, still need to be justified by reason.
A second characteristic of deliberative democracy is that the reasons given to the process should be accessible to all the citizens to whom they are addressed. To justify imposing their will on you, your fellow citizens must give reasons that are comprehensible to you. If you seek to impose your will on them, you owe them no less. This form of reciprocity means that the reasons must be public, not merely in the privacy of one’s mind. In this respect deliberative democracy stands in contrast to Rousseau’s conception of democracy, in which individuals reflect on their own what is right for the society as a whole, and then come to the assembly and vote in accordance with the general will.
The third characteristic of deliberative democracy is that its process aims at producing a decision that is binding for some period of time. In this respect the deliberative process is not like a talk show or an academic seminar. The participants do not argue for argument’s sake; they do not argue even for truth’s own sake (although the truthfulness of their argument is a deliberative virtue because it is a necessary aim in justifying their decision). They intend their discussion to influence a decision the government will make, or a process that will affect how future decisions are made. At some point, the deliberation temporarily ceases, and the leaders make a decision.
This continuation of debate illustrates the fourth characteristic of deliberative democracy—its process is dynamic. Although deliberation aims at a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a justification today will suffice for the indefinite future. It keeps open the possibility of a continuing dialogue, one in which citizens can criticize previous decisions and move ahead on the basis of that criticism. Although a decision must stand for some period of time, it is provisional in the sense that it must be open to challenge at some point in the future. This characteristic of deliberative democracy is neglected even by most of its proponents.
Deliberative democrats care as much about what happens after a decision is made as about what happens before. Keeping the decision-making process open in this way—recognizing that its results are provisional—is important for two reasons. First, in politics as in much of practical life, decision-making processes and the human understanding upon which they depend are imperfect. Therefore, we cannot be sure that the decisions we make today will be correct tomorrow, and even the decisions that appear most sound at the time may appear less justifiable in light of later evidence.
One important implication of this dynamic feature of deliberative democracy is that the continuing debate it requires should observe what we call the principle of the economy of moral disagreement. In giving reasons for their decisions, citizens and their representatives should try to find justifications that minimize their differences with their opponents. Deliberative democrats do not expect deliberation always or even usually to yield agreement. How citizens deal with the disagreement that is endemic in political life should therefore be a central question in any democracy. Practicing the economy of moral disagreement promotes the value of mutual respect (which is at the core of deliberative electoral democracy). By economizing on their disagreements, citizens and their representatives can continue to work together to find common ground, if not on the policies that produced the disagreement, then on related policies about which they stand a greater chance of finding agreement.
Combining these four characteristics, we can define deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future. We can further refine it is meaning and defend it is claims by considering to what extent deliberative democracy is democratic; what purposes it serves; why it is better than the alternatives; what kinds of deliberative/participatory democracy are justifiable; and how its critics can be answered.
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